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The following two propositions frame the classic debate about the
link between legal metaphysics and ethics:
(1) The law is a fiction-merely a construct of lawyers' arguments
and the relatively arbitrary action of decision makers.
(2) A judge should state that the law stands for whatever result the
judge deems to be correct.
Legal skeptics believe some form of (1), a proposition of metaphysics.
Opponents of legal skeptics (call them idealists) typically claim the skeptic
also believes (2), something that looks like a proposition of ethics. The
idealist then identifies (2) with nihilism-the belief that there are no valid
or true ethical principles. This essay examines the debate between skeptics
and idealists in light of a detailed examination of one idealist's attempt to
paint skeptics as nihilists, concluding that not only are idealists unfair to
their skeptical colleagues, but that historically skeptics have often pro-
posed substantial reforms to the legal system based on deeply held moral
beliefs.
The essay begins by reviewing twentieth century idealist attacks on
skeptics, showing the long and vigorous idealist tradition of treating skep-
tics as nihilists. Second is a brief discussion of the philosophical debate
concerning the "fact/value distinction," a distinction that plays a central
role in the skeptic/idealist debate. Third, the essay introduces a version of
the idealist attack on skeptics focused on the ethics of the practicing law-
yer, considering first how this idealist attack matches various possible
pictures or representations of what the legal profession is and does, and
then considering the logic of the argument in detail, showing that nihilism
is.not a logical consequence of legal skepticism. Finally, the essay shows
that historically, far from being nihilists, legal skeptics typically use skep-
ticism in the service of a deeply held reformist or revolutionary moral
agenda.
* Copyright © 1997 Eric A. Bilsky. Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School. B.A., 1985, Yale College; M.A., 1987, University of California at Los
Angeles; J.D., 1991, Harvard Law School.
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Throughout this century, idealists have repeatedly accused skeptics
of being no more than amoral nihilists.' For example, critics of Jerome
Frank's skeptical theories found in them "a desire to exalt brute power
and official arbitrariness at the expense of the right, the orderly, the law-
ful, and the just." Thus, idealist critics of legal skeptics have avoided
reasoned analysis of skeptical argument on its own terms, instead im-
plying or asserting that the skeptic's denial that morality is intrinsically
part of the law is the same as the denial of morality tout court.
In the 1940s, a group of Jesuit scholars not only accused Justice
Holmes of advocating the position that "might makes right," but warned
that adherence to a Holmesian jurisprudence had led to Nazism in Ger-
many and could lead to totalitarian rule in this country.3 A characteristic
outburst shows the violence of these criticisms: "This much must be said
for Realism. If man is only an animal, Realism is correct, Holmes was
correct, Hitler is correct."'
While the Jesuits' position seems extreme, even more temperate
commentators took the link between legal skepticism and Nazism seri-
ously. The famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, on the
separation of law and morals,5 focuses in part on the arguments of Rad-
bruch. Radbruch was a German philosopher who abandoned his prewar
positivism precisely because he came to believe that positivist views
were partly responsible for Nazism.' One might expect that a distin-
guished legal theorist like Fuller would reject out of hand the claim that
Nazism somehow followed from, or was particularly compatible with,
positivism. Instead, Fuller appeared to endorse the claim, stating:
1. See Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1216-17
(1981) (discussing this phenomenon).
2. See K.N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COL. L. REv.
581, 601 (1940) (describing reactions to Jerome Frank's attempt to use psychoanalytic theory to
explain why lawyers mistakenly-according to Frank's skeptical views-believed that rules of law
determine results in cases).
3. See G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 51, 65-67
(1971) (describing the attacks made on Holmes in five articles: John C. Ford, The Fundamentals of
Holmes' Juristic Philosophy, 11 FORDHAM L. REv. 255, 275 (1942); Paul L. Gregg, The
Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 31 GEO. L.J. 262, 284, 293-94 (1943); Francis E. Lucey,
Jurisprudence and the Future Social Order, 16 Soc. Sci. 211 (1941); Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law
and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic
Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493, 512, 531 (1942); Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 A.B.A.
J. 569, 571-73 (1945)). While these articles attacked every segment of Holmes' philosophy as
immoral, it is clear that they viewed his skepticism about law to be inextricably linked to the
encouragement given by his philosophy to totalitarianism.
4. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism, supra note 3, at 531.
5. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv.
593 (1958).
6. Fuller, supra note 5, at 657-61; Hart, supra note 5, at 617-18.
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Let us put aside at least the blunter tools of invective and address
ourselves as calmly as we can to the question whether legal positiv-
ism as practiced and preached in Germany, had, or could have had,
any causal connection with Hitler's ascent to power. It should be re-
called that in the seventy-five years before the Nazi regime the posi-
tivistic philosophy had achieved in Germany a standing such as it
enjoyed in no other country ....
I cannot see either absurdity or perversity in the suggestion that
the attitudes prevailing in the German legal profession were helpful to
the Nazis. Hitler did not come to power by a violent revolution. He
was Chancellor before he became the Leader. The exploitation of le-
gal forms started cautiously and became bolder as power was con-
solidated. The first attacks on the established order were on ramparts
which, if they were manned by anyone, were manned by lawyers and
judges. These ramparts fell almost without a struggle.7
Fuller's "calm" discussion shows how easily idealists convinced
themselves that skepticism denied morality. Fuller appears unwilling to
investigate the paths open to a positivist, on the one hand, and an idealist,
on the other, to confront an immoral legal regime. By stressing the separa-
tion of law and morals, positivism allows its adherent to identify for her-
self the moral beliefs she holds paramount. Such a positivist, living in
Germany during the rise of Nazism, would have been free to assess the
changes in the law enacted by the Nazis and the morality of those changes.
If the positivist concluded that a rule of law enacted by the Nazis was im-
moral, the positivist would then be forced to ask "the final moral question:
'Ought this rule of law to be obeyed?"'8 The situation of the idealist would
have been similar. An idealist who believes, in general, that law is inher-
ently moral would have had to make a comparable "final moral judgment":
Is this purported Nazi rule of law, actually a law, or really a lawless act of
an immoral government? In other words, neither idealist nor positivist
theory compels the lawyer to embrace a noxious doctrine like Nazism, nor
do they compel her to oppose it. As Professor Hart pointed out, the real
question is why the distinction between law and morals acquired a sinister
character in Germany, while elsewhere, for example with the Utilitarians,
it "went along with the most enlightened liberal attitudes." The failure of
idealists such as Fuller to appreciate this rather simple insight shows the
extreme visceral reaction positivism has evoked in its opponents.
Even rather innocuous expressions of legal skepticism have met with
withering criticism. Judge Thurman Arnold, a skeptic of the legal realist
school, contended in a debate with Henry Hart that in criticizing the com-
7. Fuller, supra note 5, at 658-59.
8. Hart, supra note 5, at 618.
9. Id.
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petence of contemporary judicial opinions, Hart had simply dismissed as
poorly reasoned any opinion that disagreed with his own views on the
subject.'" As a secondary point, Arnold contested the theory of judicial
deliberation relied upon by Hart, in the voice of a practitioner correcting
the unrealistic picture of an academic." As to deliberation, contra Hart,
Arnold maintained that "there is no such thing as a process of maturing of
collective thought, no such thing as a process of reason, no such thing as
decisions rigorously governed by principle," in deliberations of the Su-
preme Court (or, by extension, deliberations of other judges).'2 Arnold
offered as an alternative that a court composed of "men of widely differing
experience representing many facets of American thought," will express
conflicts that will add to the growth of American law.'3
Despite the context of the debate, and the clear implication that law
could grow and reach good results through discussion between judges of
diverse viewpoints, Alexander Bickel responded emotionally to Arnold's
view:
This is cynicism pure and simple. And here, as in other realms,
cynicism is what the late Henry L. Stimson called it: "the only deadly
sin." As always, there is no reply to be made to it other than that if the
estimate of reality on which it feeds is in any degree correct, then the
reality must be changed to exactly that degree. The sin is mortal, be-
cause it propagates a self-validating picture of reality. If men are told
complacently enough that this is how things are, they will become ac-
customed to it and accept it. And in the end, this is how things will
be. That is the reason such a view, or non-view, of the judicial proc-
ess as Judge Arnold's must be noticed and seen for what it is.'
4
The idealist, Bickel, violently attacks the perceived nihilism of the skeptic,
not seeing that the skeptic has proposed an alternative picture of how the
law can be moral, but insisting rather that the skeptic has simply embraced
immorality.
10. Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298, 1317 (1960); see
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 84 (1959).
11. Arnold stated:
But if Professor Hart had ever tried to hold together a majority in favor of an opinion
which he had written (as I have done on occasion) he would know that compromise in the
form of an ambiguity may be inevitable. He would find that he would have to put in
something which he believes created an ambiguity in order to avoid provoking a dissent
or a concurring opinion which would create even more ambiguity since the Court would
be unanimous only on the result. He would find that men can sometimes agree on a
result, but rarely on all of the reasons for that result, and that attempts to spell out reasons
may be futile.
Arnold, supra note 10, at 1312.
12. Id. at 1311-13.
13. Id. at 1314.
14. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF PoLmcs 84 (1962) (citation omitted).
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Ronald Dworkin, the most influential contemporary idealist, has
taken a similarly hard, emotional line against skeptics. Opposing the posi-
tivist who claims that there is no "right" answer to hard legal questions-
seemingly a metaphysical claim-Dworkin responds that "the controversy
is really about morality, not metaphysics, and the no-right-answer thesis,
understood as a moral claim, is deeply unpersuasive in morality as in
law." Later in the same book, Dworkin refers to "the cynic's mocking
discovery that it [law] is nowhere at all."'6 Still later, in summarizing an
argument against positivism, Dworkin again reaches for ethical (and per-
haps even aesthetic) judgments:
These bizarre conclusions [that Dworkin claims to have drawn
from positivism] must be wrong. Law is a flourishing practice, and
though it may well be flawed, even fundamentally, it is not a gro-
tesque joke. It means something to say that judges should enforce
rather than ignore the law, that citizens should obey it except in rare
cases, that officials are bound by its rule."
Once again we see the idealist's refusal to analyze a skeptical claim on its
own terms. Instead, the idealist insists on seeing an attack on idealism as
an attack on his morality. The idealist therefore emotionally denounces as
"bizarre" and "grotesque" any position differing substantially from his
own.
In sum, there is a very strong strain in the idealist position which
holds that an adherent to legal skepticism must be, at best, a nihilist.
Hence, the ethical consequences of legal skepticism are allegedly so re-
pugnant that they justify the rejection of legal skepticism without further
ado.
III. THE FACT/VALUE DIsTINCTION
Metaphysics is concerned, in the most general sense conceivable,
with describing the world. The metaphysician may ask what is the nature
of law. Are laws nonphysical entities that exist in some different plane of
reality? Are laws like mathematical rules? Are society's laws like the
laws of science? Are laws entities, such as ideas in the mind or concepts
in language? In contrast, ethics is concerned, in a similar general sense,
with how to value and act in the world. The ethicist may ask whether
there is a duty to obey the law simply because it is the law, or inquire
into the relationship between morality and law.
No readily apparent, necessary link exists between the kind of ques-
tions considered in the metaphysics of law and the kind of questions con-
sidered in the ethics of law. That an "ought" cannot be derived from an
"is" is a clich6 of metaphysics. An ethical principle cannot be derived as
15. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE at ix (1986).
16. Id. at9.
17. Id. at 44.
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a necessary consequence from a metaphysical (or physical) principle.'"
This clich6 is not universally accepted, and in some sense is at the heart
of the dispute that concerns this essay, since idealists want to argue that
certain (bad) value judgments follow from a skeptical position. The lin-
guistic formulation of the fact/value distinction, that no conclusion con-
taining an evaluative term may be deduced unless the evaluative term is
present in the premises,'9 follows straightforwardly from the view that
logic does nothing more than make explicit what is implicit in the
meanings of the premises. Therefore, we can view the linguistic formu-
lation as a methodological admonition, rather than a demonstrable truth.
Whenever an argument purports to deduce an evaluative judgment from
plain statements of fact, examine the statements of fact to see if you can
identify a hidden evaluative premise.
There are three interesting ways to attack the linguistic fact/value
distinction. First, the antidescriptivist may argue that language is so in-
tertwined with purposes that an evaluative component may not be ana-
lyzed out of language. Second, the antidescriptivist may argue that lan-
guage always presupposes moral beliefs, so that a separate descriptive
component cannot be analyzed out of language. Third, the antidescrip-
tivist may analyze language as a human behavior, in the context of hu-
man institutions and cultures that presuppose certain values, so that an
attempt to analyze out descriptive and evaluative components separately
from these institutions and cultures must always be incorrect. While the
disputes over these attacks are too intractable to resolve in any short (or
long) discussion, this essay sets forth reasons why the fact/value distinc-
tion should be retained as a methodological tool.
18. See, e.g., R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 32 (Clarendon Press 1982) (noting "an
imperative cannot appear in the conclusion of a valid inference, unless there is at least one
imperative in the premisses"); DAVID HOME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 470 (2d ed., Selby
Bigge Clarendon Press 1978) (the source of this insight); G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 67-69
(Thomas Baldwin rev. ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (exploring the open question argument,
pointing out that after any description of a state of affairs, it is still an open question whether that
state of affairs is good). It may be noted that this distinction is parallel to the distinction drawn
between observational and theoretical terms in the logical positivist theory of science. See, e.g.,
JOHN LOSEE, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 190 (2d ed. 1985);
Rudolf Camap, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics 143-45, 202-09 in 1 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE pt. I (0. Neurath & R. Carnap eds., 1955). This second
distinction is undermined by the insight that all language and observation seems to be colored by
context and world view so that all observations are to some extent theory laden. See, e.g., NORWOOD
RUSSELL HANSON, PATrERNS OF DISCOVERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
OF SCIENCE 85-92 (1958); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111-23
(2d ed. 1970); LOSEE, supra, at 190-92, 197-200, 205; Paul Feyerabend, An Attempt at a Realistic
Interpretation of Experience, 58 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 143, 148-49, 160-64 (1958). Whether
the interdependence between observation and theory terms in the area of science can be shown to be
parallel with an interdependence between description and evaluation terms in the area of ethics is
briefly discussed below.
19. See, e.g., HARE, supra note 18, at 28-31; J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND
WRONG 72-73 (1977).
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A. Is There a (Separable) Evaluative Component in Language?
The antidescriptivist may argue that a linguist cannot analyze out of
certain words any covert evaluative component. This is so, the argument
goes, because all language is to some extent theory-laden, and so some
language is evaluative theory, or value-laden.0 Hence, the antidescrip-
tivist might claim that there are "thick" ethical terms, like bravery, cow-
ardice, charity, and so forth, that interweave the descriptive and the
evaluative inextricably.
The antidescriptivist claim fails for a couple of related reasons.
First, the antidescriptivist cannot give a satisfactory account of the error
in analyzing a thick ethical term into a descriptive and an evaluative
component. The typical antidescriptivist objection is that to know the
meaning of a thick ethical term, one cannot rely on a "mere" description.
Instead, one must know the purpose for using the term. According to the
antidescriptivist, the purpose will be inextricably linked, not to descrip-
tion, but to evaluation.2' For example, terms such as "coward, lie, brutal-
ity" and "gratitude" are said to be linked to their function, their role in
the way people live, in a way that mere description cannot capture."
While the objection that "description" cannot capture "function"
raises a mare's nest of issues in the theory of language, the resolution of
these tangled issues turns out not to be relevant to the success of the ob-
jection. In the early twentieth century, an "atomistic" picture of language
was set forth which has the following properties: the principal aim of
language is to describe reality by constructing sentences that .correspond
to the world; the meaning of language is built up from the meanings of
each of its parts; the core units for analysis of language are the word and
the sentence; and each word (or sentence) can be analyzed into a "true",
logical form.23 The claim that thick ethical concepts can be analyzed into
covert descriptive and evaluative components is taken to be a claim of
this school of linguistic analysis. In contrast, and in revolt against this
school, some philosophers of language claimed that language should be
treated as an artifact, a tool just like other tools we use. Hence, language
must be described as part of practices or conventions or forms of life."
20. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, EThics AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 141-42 (1985);
Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MicH. L. REV. 1187, 1205 n.36 (1994).
21. See WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 141-42; Philippa Foot, Moral Beliefs 83, 85, 92 in
THEORIES OF ETIcs (Philippa Foot ed., 1967); Feldman, supra note 20, at 1212 n.42.
22. See WILLIAMS, supra note 20, 140-41.
23. See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, Introduction to LUDWIG WrITGENSTEIN, TACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS 7-21 (Tactatus trans., C.K. Ogden Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1985); LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 1, at 2-3 (G.E.M. trans., Anscombe Macmillan
3d ed. 1989).
24. See, e.g., WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 23, § 11, at 6
("Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-drive, a rule, a glue-pot,
nails, and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects."); Id. § 23,
19971
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Since words are interrelated with each other and other behavior as part of
a practice, it is fundamentally mistaken to attempt to assign individual
meanings to individual words.
If the correct theory of language were not "atomistic," but instead
"holistic," then meanings could not be parceled out to individual words.
Instead, the meaning of language would depend on the seamless inter-
connection of all words with each other and with the practices in the
world and forms of life the words described. If the holistic theory were
correct, we could not winnow out, for one individual word, a separate
descriptive component.
The holistic objection to atomistic theory is fair, but irrelevant to the
fact/value distinction. What we must ask is: Is it intelligible to speak of a
particular practice in terms of its "function," and in terms of the reasons
for action someone engaging in that practice may have, without our-
selves adopting or endorsing that practice? If so, we can separate some
kind of (holistic) description from (moral) evaluation.
I have yet to see an example where description and evaluation can-
not be separated in this way, so it seems wise to use the fact/value dis-
tinction as a methodological tool, until such an example is put forth.
Hence, while we cannot treat words atomistically if we must treat them
as a part of practices, we can still distinguish between description and
evaluation. Just as words can be analyzed on the atomistic theory, prac-
tices can be analyzed on the holistic theory.' In sum, the possibility that
the correct theory of language may be holistic appears, in and of itself, to
have no bediring on the issue of whether description may be distinguished
from evaluation.
B. Is There a (Separable) Descriptive Component to Language?
The antidescriptivist may make a different kind of holistic claim,
namely that "thick concepts" are parts of world views that are theories of
the world in the same way that scientific theories are theories of the
world. The holist might claim that scientific theories are theory all the
way down-for example, one can see observations of the sky as either
observations of celestial bodies circling the earth or observations of the
apparent movement of celestial bodies caused by the movement of the
earth beneath the feet of the observer.26 A holist would argue that an ob-
at 11 ("Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking
of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.").
25. Of course the analysis does not show what is really going on, in the sense that saying
water is really 110 shows the real chemical structure of water, but the analysis is nevertheless a
useful way of describing what is going on, just as something may be usefully described as either a
valiant exhibition of courage or a quarterback sneak (while not really being more one than the other)
depending on our purpose. WrlrGENsTEN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 23, § 22,
at 10-11.
26. See, e.g., LosEE, supra note 18, at 190-92; Feyerabend, supra note 18, at 160-64.
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servation of the world cannot be described, even in the most basic terms,
without invoking a theory. Similarly, one could argue that the use of
"thick" ethical terms is colored by theory, such that no purely descriptive
component could be separated out. The analogy does not destroy the
usefulness of the fact/value distinction, since, relative to any particular
purpose, and for any scientific activity, we can distinguish between ob-
servational and theoretical components. For example, a physicist can
distinguish between "seeing" the paths of sub-atomic particles (theory)
and describing patterns of bubbles in a cloud chamber (observation)."
Similarly, relative to any evaluative activity, like praising brave acts, for
the meaning of "brave" I can separate out an evaluative component
(praise) from the descriptive (seeing someone take an action that risks
personal injury to achieve some goal). Hence, while the fact/value dis-
tinction may not be an absolute distinction, relative to any specified level
of description, i.e., a set of firmly held beliefs, one can distinguish fact
from value.
C. Is Language Analytically Separable from Human Institutions?
The third attack on the fact/value distinction, related to the analogy
to scientific theories, is based on the claim that language has a function
in institutions. The simple, but seminal, form of the modem attack on
this distinction is that, if we understand the meaning of terms like prom-
ise, we can see that evaluative conclusions do follow from descriptive
premises. For example, from the sentence "Jones stated 'I promise to pay
Smith five dollars,"' we can infer that "Jones ought to pay Smith five
dollars."' This example shows that certain institutions or practices, if
accepted, entail value judgments. To accept the institution of promising
is to accept that promises ought to be kept.
Nonetheless, the fact/value distinction is still useful. The proposi-
tion: "John ought to pay Smith five dollars," is properly seen as estab-
lished only relative to some unexpressed presuppositions. One presuppo-
sition would be that the full conclusion ought to be: "Someone who ac-
cepts the institution of promising must believe that 'John ought to pay
Smith five dollars."' An alternative is that the argument presupposes the
premise: "The value judgments implied by the application of the institu-
tion of promising to facts in the world are objectively true."' We can
understand that there is an institution of promising that requires that
promises be kept, and still wonder whether one "ought" to accept that
institution, either altogether, or at any particular instant. We can describe
27. See, e.g., LOSEE, supra note 18, at 192.
28. See John R. Searle, How to Derive an "Ought" from an "Is," 73 PHIL. REV. 43, 44
(1964).
29. See MACKIE, supra note 19, at 64-72 (presenting a cogent assessment of the significance
of Searle's "ought" to "is" derivation).
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the facts of an institution without in any way endorsing or accepting the
institution.
IV. PICTURES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Historically, legal theory is judge-centered, but it does not need to
be. The skepticism/idealism dispute can be recast to focus on lawyers.
We considered two propositions above as framing the debate between
skeptics and idealists:
1) The law is a fiction-merely a construct of lawyers' arguments and
the relatively arbitrary action of decision makers.
2) A judge should state that the law stands for whatever result the
judge deems to be correct.
A plausible analogue for proposition (2) is
2') A lawyer should do whatever her client wishes-she should argue
that the law stands for whatever result her client desires.
In parallel with the morality-based attacks leveled against judge-centered
skeptical theories, one commentator, David Luban, has argued that some-
thing like proposition 2' follows from legal skepticism, that 2' is repugnant,
and that therefore legal skepticism is a false metaphysical position.' A
critical reading of his arguments illustrates the difficulty, if not impossibil-
ity, of forcing a legal skeptic to commit to a particular ethical position as a
consequence of his metaphysics. Hence, the critical reading illustrates the
fallacy of equating legal skepticism with nihilism.
A complete picture of law in society will include both a theory of the
status of legal rules and a theory of the relation of those rules, and the
practice of lawyers, to morality. While any legal ethics is logically inde-
pendent of a descriptive picture of the world, ethics and metaphysics may
be linked in emotional, thematic ways. A picture of the world as a raw,
impersonal struggle may serve to rationalize an ethics grounded in self-
love; a picture of the world as an intricate, interdependent web of relation-
ships may serve to rationalize an ethics grounded in universal love. Thus,
any particular legal metaphysical theory may, in fact, be linked by its pro-
ponents to legal ethics. For example, a metaphysical theory that conceived
of laws as ideal objects might be linked with, and used to rationalize, an
ethics that viewed obedience to the law as inherently good. On the other
hand, a metaphysics that analogized laws to customs subject to change
over time might be linked to an ethics which holds that there is no moral
requirement to obey the law.
It also seems logically consistent to hold a theory in which laws are
abstract ideals, but nevertheless not inherently good. For example, laws of
30. See DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JuSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
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science may be conceived of as abstract ideals, without obedience to the
ideal carrying any moral import. (Indeed, obedience to a law of science is
constrained by nature and is typically thought to have no moral weight
whatsoever.) Equally, one could hold that laws, as society's customs, nev-
ertheless morally compel obedience. For example, one might hold that we
have a duty to respect other people and from that duty derive a duty to
obey customs.
In one popular picture of the law, the law is complex. In difficult
cases good answers may be hard to come by, but though resolutions of the
cases are difficult, they are not arbitrary. Because the law is not arbitrary,
lawyers, being honorable professionals, do not argue that the law stands
for whatever their client wants. Instead, a lawyer will take a legally defen-
sible position in an attempt to advance her client's legitimate interests. A
lawyer will not take a legally impermissible position, not only because she
is ethical, but also because she knows that an impermissible position will
be recognized as such and will be rejected by her adversaries and the deci-
sion maker. This view might be called the establishment picture.
The other popular view might be called the skeptical picture. Ac-
cording to this view, lawyers are not constrained by professional honor,
since the law is arbitrary. Lawyers are not constrained by the prudential
boundaries of an objectively determinable law, since there is no objec-
tively determinable law. Rather, the forces of the market, or perceptions of
duty to the client, without opposition, impel the lawyer to maximize her
profit by advocating her client's interests as zealously as possible, without
regard to any independent conception of the meaning of the law she is
interpreting. The lawyer may take this aggressive interpretive stance pre-
cisely because the law is just a relatively arbitrary social construct. The
law is infinitely malleable and interpretable, thus the lawyer can bend it to
her client's ends.
Idealist attacks on legal skeptics seem implicitly to treat these two
rival pictures as if they are the only two possibilities. This essay referred
above to the possible emotional or thematic link between metaphysical and
ethical representations. The designation "emotional" or "thematic" may be
taken to be dismissive, a way of saying there is really no content at all to
the link, and partisans of the link are simply and inexplicably mistaken.
We should not ignore the possibility that we should simply dismiss the
idea of a link, but there are other possibilities as well. The kinds of theories
a culture generates may reveal a great deal about what that culture values.
Objectivity and determinacy may very well be "establishment" values.
Practitioners of a profession, like the legal profession, that is a bulwark of
the "establishment" of a society, will want both to justify and glorify their
professional role by linking their profession to the objectivity that their
culture values. In turn, the "establishment" will want to characterize its
opponents as rejecting objectivity in metaphysics and in ethics.
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The cultural analysis of views on the law/ethics connection remains
delegitimating. The cultural analysis does not concern itself at all with
whether there actually is such a link. We can also take the link view seri-
ously and worry about whether it is true. Typically, an investigation of the
possible link would follow a path from metaphysics to ethics, starting with
a picture of the world and trying to conjure a picture of right action from
that representation of the world. We should have little confidence that the
view would have the force of logic, since we know of no way to deduce an
"ought" from an "is." Nevertheless, the link may have the force of emotion
or sympathy. The description of the world may impel us to feel that certain
ways of acting in that kind of world must be given approbation, while
other ways of acting must be treated with repugnance.
The persuasion need not go in the metaphysics to ethics direction, as
the idealist attacks show. From a certain perspective, ethical knowledge is
much clearer than metaphysical knowledge. Who knows precisely what a
legal rule is? How can we argue the point? Yet who doubts that it is wrong
to lie, cheat, and steal? As we have seen above, legal theorists often attack
metaphysical views on moral grounds. If it were possible to form a chain
from such ethical truth to metaphysical truth, legal metaphysics and ethics,
and the link between them, could be firmly established.
V. AN ARGUMENT FROM ETHICS TO METAPHYSICS
One commentator, David Luban, has constructed a picture of the
legal profession and justified that picture with an argument from ethics to
metaphysics." Luban's metaphysical project ultimately fails. Examining
his argument illustrates why it appears impossible to use metaphysics to
ground legal ethics on any basis other than sympathy and, conversely,
why it appears impossible to use moral beliefs as a tool for attacking
opposing metaphysical positions. Moreover, a close examination of Lu-
ban's project shows that there are indeed many possible pictures for legal
theory to adopt, and that the simple establishment/anti-establishment
dichotomy forced on one by belief in a metaphysics/ethics link does not
accurately describe the universe of legal theories.
Luban's position is interesting and complex; he believes that the
establishment picture should be correct, but his position has the follow-
ing wrinkle: lawyers erroneously believe the anti-establishment picture. 2
Hence, while metaphysics and ethics are linked, actual behavior is not
ethical, because people do not understand what the true metaphysics and
ethics are. In Luban's idealist metaphysics, law is purposive and spirit-
driven." His legal ethic is founded on the values of community, solidar-
31. Id. at 18-20.
32. Id. at 18 (attributing this view to the critic who argues that instrumentalism is disrespectful
of the law).
33. Id. at 18, 31.
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ity, and respect for ones' fellows. The ethical lawyer takes responsibility
for, and shares the ends of, her client." While Luban's primary concern is
ethics, he makes an excursion into metaphysics in pursuit of a complex
argument intended to validate his communitarian ethical picture.
The strategy of Luban's argument straightforwardly exploits his
implicit limitation of most discourse in legal theory to the establishment
and anti-establishment pictures. First, Luban describes what he views as
the dominant theory of legal ethics, an ethics based on what he calls the
principle of partisanship." This ethics is the anti-establishment ethics that
the lawyer may do whatever her client wishes. He then claims that the
principle of partisanship follows from what he describes as the dominant
theory of legal metaphysics, legal realism.' Legal realism plays the role
of the skeptical metaphysics in the anti-establishment picture. Luban
seeks to identify and exploit the link between these metaphysical and
ethical pictures. He attempts to demonstrate that the conclusions that
follow from the principle of partisanship do not agree with the reader's
judgments about right action." Taking this repugnance to common mo-
rality to demonstrate that the principle of partisanship is false, Luban
exploits the schema by arguing that legal realism is therefore also false!8
Having established that legal realism is false, Luban poses his own ide-
alist metaphysics as the only natural alternative. 9 Finally, Luban feels
free to construct an ethical theory based on his idealist metaphysics. '
A close analysis of Luban's argument shows both how we can slip
into a distorted picture of legal theory, by misdescribing theories to force
them into one of the two pictures, and how the possibility of other pic-
tures undermines any tight link one might attempt to forge between legal
metaphysics and legal ethics.
A. The General Argument Against Legal Realism and the Principle of
Partisanship
Luban characterizes the "principle of partisanship" as that "cynical"
view of the law that holds, "[W]hen acting as an advocate, a lawyer
34. Id. at xxii, 30.
35. Id. at 7,11-18.
36. Id. at 18-19.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., id. at 26.
40. While the argument against realism is a brief passage in Luban's book, it is significant
because of its placement. Id. at 3-30. The arguments constitute the first two major arguments of the
book in chapters 1 and 2. In chapter 3, Luban confronts a related ethical claim, the "ultrarealist"
position that there is simply no obligation to obey the law. Id. at 30-49. In chapter 4 Luban
introduces what he views as possibly the most important defense of the principle of partisanship, the
complex of arguments that support the use of the adversary system (in which the principle of
partisanship plays a crucial role). Id. at 50. This article is not concerned with Luban's discussions of
the "ultrarealist" position or his discussion of the adversary system.
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must, within the established constraints of professional behavior, maxi-
mize the likelihood that the client will prevail."' Luban calls the princi-
ple of partisanship disrespectful of the law, because the principle is sup-
posed to lead to "instrumental" behavior that treats the law as an amoral
tool to be used to satisfy the client's objectives, rather than behavior that
treats the law as containing an ideal meaning. 2 According to Luban,
there are two, equally bad, types of this instrumental behavior: 3 false
formalism argues for the technical letter of the law in order to subvert its
spirit;' false idealism argues that some particular picture or policy ani-
mates the law, to defeat the letter of the law.'
Luban contends that the two types of "instrumentalism" are only
evils if we can find a true "spirit" and a true letter of the law. ' By com-
paring "instrumentalist" actions with the "true" letter or "true" spirit of
the law, we can then show that these behaviors are evil. 7 Luban believes
that we can only speak of a true letter or spirit of the law from a "picture
of law according to which its meaning, purpose, or 'spirit' is a given-
univocal, rigid, self-explanatory, and uncontroversial." Hence, Luban
moves from an ethical judgment rejecting one part of the anti-
establishment schema to a metaphysical judgment rejecting the other
part. Luban identifies cynical disrespect for the law with "legal
realism." He describes legal realism as a picture of the law that treats
law only "instrumentally," rather than treating law as having intrinsic
meaning.'
Luban links legal realism with the principle of partisanship by ap-
peal to the notion of respect. First, Luban identifies respect for the law as
a principle value of the lawyer's role morality." He criticizes the princi-
ple of partisanship as not displaying respect for the law.' 2 Luban then
contends that under legal realism, "only the law in action counts."" Next
comes the crucial move, establishing the link between metaphysics and
ethics. Under realism, Luban claims, if an official respects your actions,
your actions exhibit respect for the law. Luban concludes therefore that
"if you believe realism, you will also believe that treating the law in-
41. Id. at 7, 11. Luban takes his formulation from Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978).







49. Id. at 19.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16 ("[Olne must respect the law as it is given."); see id. at 30-49.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id.
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strumentally does not exhibit disrespect for it."" Realism thus "paves the
way for a ready adherence to the principle of partisanship.'"
From the principle of partisanship, Luban deduces ethical results
that are repugnant to commonplace morality. He then argues that these
results are incorrect only if skeptical metaphysics is false. In conclusion,
Luban draws the moral that his suggested alternative, that the law is im-
bued with the ideal content of meaning, purpose, or spirit, is correct."
B. Idealism, Realism, Operationalism, and Determinacy
Does viewing legal theory through the filter of the two pictures
cause Luban to distort his description of the universe of legal theory dis-
course? To answer this question it may be helpful to revisit some general
philosophical categories. As discussed above, schools of metaphysics
may be divided into two camps, idealists and skeptics." Idealists believe
that there are entities-such as the meanings of words, moral rules, rules
of mathematics, or laws of science-that are unlike ordinary physical
objects. These entities are supposed to correspond to universal or abstract
terms or concepts that the mind may apprehend directly' 9 Empiricist
skeptics doubt the existence of ideal entities and seek to explain the na-
ture of the meanings of words, moral rules, rules of mathematics, laws of
science, and similar phenomena by reference to observable facts of the
experienced world.'
American jurisprudence has been dominated by idealist theories
(which can be fit into the establishment schema).6' For an idealist, laws
55. Id.
56. Id. at 19-20.
57. See id. at 26.
58. The terms used to describe these two schools are numerous and confusing. Idealists in the
sense used in the text may also be referred to as realists, since they believe that ideal entities are real,
while skeptics are sometimes called nominalists, because they believe that names are just names and
do not correspond to ideal entities. Idealists may also be called rationalists, believing that we may
know the world by knowing the ideal entities via reason, while skeptics may be called empiricists,
since they believe that the world may be explained by reference to what we experience with our
senses without recourse to ideal entities. There is a broader sense of idealism that is not used in the
text. Idealism may refer to a philosophical school that holds that the world is nothing more than our
ideas, while realists, in contrast, believe that the world is independent of our ideas and exists apart
from our consciousness. The term legal realism refers to a nominalist or empiricist jurisprudence.
The label "legal realism" places the legal realists in the context of the broader American
philosophical movements of New Realism, see, e.g., EDWIN B. HOLT, THE NEW REALISM (1913),
and Critical Realism, its successor. See, e.g., DRAKE ET AL., ESSAYS IN CRITICAL REALISM: A
COOPERATIVE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (1920).
59. See, e.g., Nicholas Rescher, Idealism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
355-57 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
60. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 18, at 1-7.
61. See, e.g., Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Ry., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854) ("IThe
common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural
justice, and enlightened public policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular
cases which fall within it"); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRO-ESS 166-
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reflect or partake of rules or meanings independent of, and logically prior
to, the actual law passed by the legislature or created by the rulings of
courts. 2 A modem idealist will usually believe that, although the bare
formal rules of the actual or positive law may not go so far as to deter-
mine every case, the ideal rules of law do determine every case, thereby
closing the gaps in the actual law. 3 By reference to the ideal rules of law,
the legal practitioner may answer the hard cases where the positive rules
of law do not readily give an answer." For example, Hart and Sacks, pro-
ponents of the legal process school, believed that "[u]nderlying every
rule and standard... is at the least a policy, and in most cases a princi-
ple. This principle or policy is always available to guide judgment .... ,"
By arguing for a purposive, spirit-driven picture of the law, Luban
stamps himself an idealist, within the mainstream of American jurispru-
dence.
Legal realists are skeptics. They do not believe that there are ideal
entities corresponding to legal rules. In Felix Cohen's phrase, the real-
ists' description of law dispenses with idealism's "transcendental non-
sense,' " and pays attention only to "a number of subordinate questions,
67 (1958) ("Underlying every rule and standard, in other words, is at the least a policy and in most
cases a principle. This principle or policy is always available to guide judgment in resolving
uncertainties about the arrangement's meaning."); CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF
CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS 2 (1879) ("Law, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant
facility ... constitutes a true lawyer...."); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057,
1060 (1975) (stating that "judicial decisions in civil cases... characteristically are and should be
generated by principle not policy"); Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in
Moral and Legal History, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 335, 336-37 (1980) ("The law is a moral science, and
judges, in determining the law, decide as moral agents ... [O]ne way to get a judge to make a
particular decision is to make that decision the correct conclusion for a moral argument."); Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 381 (1978) (adjudication,
consisting of the case-by-case development or principle, is "a third area of rational discourse, not
embraced by empirical fact or logical implication"); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision,
36 HARv. L. REv. 641,645 (1923) (stating that law consists of three elements: legal precepts, a body
of traditional ideas as to how legal precepts should be interpreted, and "a body of philosophical,
political, and ethical ideas as to the end of law ... with reference to which legal precepts... are
continually reshaped and given new content and application"); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15 (1959) ("Mhe main constituent of the
judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate
result that is achieved.").
62. See, e.g., supra texts cited at note 61.
63. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 61, at 1060.
64. id.
65. HART & SACKS, supra note 61, at 166-67.
66. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935). For example, Cohen wrote: "Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of legal
concepts, rules, and arguments, must be independent both of ethics and of such positive sciences as
economics or psychology. In effect, it is a special branch of the science of transcendental nonsense."
Id. at 821.
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each of which refers to the actual behavior of courts." 7 For purposes of
his argument, Luban characterizes legal realism as an operationalist ju-
risprudence that reduces the law to repeated procedures and outcomes
consisting of courts considering cases and ruling to punish or not punish
specific acts and actors. Luban takes the definitive statement of realism
to be Oliver Wendell Holmes' maxim that "[tihe prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law." In further support of his operationalist characterization, Luban
cites the Felix Cohen maxim, set forth above, that law refers to "the ac-
tual behavior of courts" 9 and cites to Cohen and Karl Llewellyn's con-
clusion that the law is about predicting what officials do about disputes."
Luban thereby identifies legal realism with the operationalist theory that
the law is nothing but the body of predictions of how the courts will be-
have in specific cases.
Schools of metaphysics may also be described as determinist or
indeterminist.7' This dichotomy seems logically independent of the ide-
alist/skeptic divide. One can construct a formal logic that can be viewed
as reflecting ideal logical concepts, and yet prove that the logic is incom-
plete, i.e., fails to determine for certain sentences whether the sentences
are logical truths. 2 Hence the indeterminist logic corresponds (albeit not
completely) to an ideal reality. On the other hand, a skeptic could believe
that a system of mathematical postulates was complete, without believing
that the postulates reflected anything more than rules for the manipula-
tion of symbols. Legal idealists nevertheless tend to argue as if idealism
and determinism were linked parts of the establishment schema. They
rely on the existence of ideal legal objects to ensure that the law deter-
mines every case. Much of the tension in this debate is over determinism,
not idealism proper.
Luban's emphasis on the operationalist aspect of legal realism is
consistent with the failure to identify determinism as a separate major
issue. Luban wishes to attack an indeterminist view of the law which
67. LUBAN, supra note 30, at 20 (quoting Felix Cohen, The Problems of a Functional
Jurisprudence, I MOD. L. REV. 5, 16 (1937)).
68. Id. (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897)).
69. Id. (quoting Felix Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, I MOD. L. REV. 5,
16(1937)).
70. Id. (quoting Felix Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5,
16 (1937); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 12 (1951)).
71. The Critical Legal Studies school has stressed the importance of the concept of
indeterminacy in realist and critical thought. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1213 ("Realism
showed that subjectivity and indeterminacy resulted when analysis was confined to traditional legal
discourse."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209,
360 (1979) ("For any given factual conflict of rights, the doctrinal structure will offer a choice of
categorizations; the techniques of reasoning that are supposed to tell us which choice to make will
themselves reproduce that choice at another level.").
72. See Kurt G6del, Ober Formal Uunentscheidbare Sitz der Principia Mathematica und
Verwandter Systeme 1, 38 MONATSHEFTE FOR MATHEMATIK UND PHYSIK 173 (1931).
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denies that the law can be "univocal ... [and] self-explanatory."7 Opera-
tionalism does not entail indeterminism. An operationalist can perfectly
well believe that the observable, repeatable behaviors he uses to define
law, such as the behavior of judges, exhibit predictable regularities. What
he will not believe is that the regularities are explained and determined
by ideal entities-such as principles or policies-floating above the
plane of behavior. Fairly sophisticated attempts have been made to for-
mulate operationalist theories of law. For example, Max Black offered an
operational account of rules in which a rule has just two components: 1)
a description of a class of actions and 2) an indication whether that class
is required, forbidden, or allowed. ' Alf Ross has shown how rules about
the fictive ideal concept "t0-tfi" can be reduced to rules about behavior."
Both these operationalist theories result in a picture of univocal rules
yielding unique results.
It is not necessary to be an operationalist to deny law's univocal
character. The positivist legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart portrayed law
as grounded in language, not in operations. Hart secured the partial
regularity of law by a linguistic theory in which there are many core
cases of meaning for legal rules-cases for which there is no difficulty in
determining what the law is in practice. 6 Yet in extraordinary cases
where, according to his theory, the meaning of the law gave out, Hart
would differ from a determinist and describe the judge's role as legislat-
ing among unforced alternatives."
The heirs to Legal Realism, theorists of the Critical Legal Studies
movement, are not operationalists. Instead, at least some of them seem to
believe that law has a large scale ideal structure. In contrast to the ideal-
ists, practitioners of Critical Legal Studies believe the ideal structure is
never univocal. The hallmark of Critical Legal Studies is the slogan that
for every principle there is a counter-principle, for every policy a coun-
ter-policy, for every rule a counter-rule. 8
73. LuBAN, supra note 30, at 18.
74. Max Black, Notes on the Meaning of 'Rule,' 24 THlOIuA 107, 119 (1958), reprinted in
The Analysis of Rules, in MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 95,
107-08 (1962).
75. Alf Ross, Tf-Ti, 70 HARV. L. REv. 812 (1957).
76. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, supra note 5, at 607.
77. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961) ("The open texture of law
means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or
officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between competing interests which vary in
weight from case to case.").
78. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORwTrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
(1977) (describing the transformation of contract law from the dominant equitable theory to the
dominant will theory); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1000 (1985) (discussing "doctrinal structures that depend on the dualities of public and
private, objective and subjective, form and substance"); Kennedy, supra note 71, at 355 ("The
conflict of rights occurs at every level of the legal system, at least as liberalism conceives the
system.").
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In sum, it is not the operationalism of legal realism that forces it to
deny law's univocal character, but rather legal realism's emphasis that
extra-legal considerations, such as politics, psychology, and social class,
determine the judge's actions.
The proper target for Luban's attack is that strain of jurisprudence
that unites realists and critics: the denial of law's univocal character and
the assertion of its fundamental indeterminacy. The realist and the critic
both agree that law cannot be predicted from some ideal structure-the
realist because he denies the existence of an ideal structure, the critic
because he denies its efficacy. Thus, when Luban takes realism as de-
fined by Oliver Wendell Holmes' slogan, "[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law"' as his enemy, he fails to directly attack Critical Legal Studies,
the only current academic school of jurisprudence that might trouble
him. On the other hand, the target of Luban's argument does end up be-
ing indeterminist theory. As will be seen below, the "nothing more pre-
tentious" clause of Holmes' slogan, which denies idealism altogether,
plays no role in Luban's argument. Only the denial that idealism can
determine an answer is attacked. Thus, Luban's arguments, if successful,
will weigh as heavily against the idealist Critical Legal Studies as against
legal realism.
C. The Dominant Metaphysics and Its Relation to Ethics
To make the connection between metaphysics and ethics relevant,
Luban must argue that realist metaphysics actually influences lawyers'
behavior. Luban characterizes legal realism as the "dominant school of
jurisprudence in twentieth-century America."' His thesis is gravely un-
dermined by the observation that legal realism is far from the dominant
strain of twentieth century jurisprudence. Although realism rose in
popularity, as a reaction against formalist idealism in the twenties and
thirties, idealism made a vigorous comeback in the fifties and sixties with
the Legal Process and Neutral Principles schools,8' the liberal jurispru-
dence of thinkers like Ronald Dworkin,82 and the emergence of the law
and economics school.83 Although realist-style indeterminacy arguments
79. LuBAN, supra note 30, at 20 (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REv. 457, 461 (1897)).
80. Id. at 19. Luban's pursuit of this argument apparently began with a commentary on an
article by Stephen L. Pepper. Id. at 20 n.16. Pepper introduced the mischaracterization of legal
realism as the dominant school. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Role: A Defense, a
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 624 (1986). Luban adopted it
without further analysis. David L. Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen
Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 646 (1986).
81. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 61 (explaining legal process); Wechsler, supra note
61 (explaining neutral principles).
82. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 61.
83. See, e.g., DwoRiuN, supra note 15, at 276-80; Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2260 (1996).
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have been revived in the last twenty years with the skeptical analyses of
Critical Legal Studies, that school is far from achieving academic domi-
nance.84
If determinist idealism, rather than legal realism, is the dominant
academic legal metaphysics, Luban's attempt to explain the current pro-
fessional-role morality by reference to metaphysics is refuted, because he
cannot establish a causal link between the two. Luban has an implicit
reply to this criticism. He argues that although realism is not taught as
the favored doctrine in jurisprudence classes, it is taught, implicitly, in
every single substantive legal class. '5 Students are continually called
upon to distinguish and analogize cases and to argue for whatever posi-
tion is assigned. While professors claim to believe the law is determinate,
they actually teach that it is indeterminate." Thus, the message of legal
instruction may always be a closet realism. The teaching demonstrates
that the law is indeterminate and infinitely manipulable. Idealism is hon-
ored, but realism is taught.87 If closet realism is taught, Luban may
maintain his thesis.
There are at least five possible explanations for the seeming paradox
that idealism is officially honored while legal theory manipulation is
taught. Closet realism is only one of them. A second explanation relies
on our adversary system of justice and a redescription of what is taught
in law school. The idealist professor could object that the closet realist
account is just a misunderstanding of legal education. What is really
taught is idealist theory building. The student starts out with a toolbox of
cases, rules, and policies and a position to support. She then builds a le-
gal theory which provides a principle or policy to explain thd cases and
support her position. In short, the student learns legal argumefit. The
student is allowed to use it for her client because of the belief that our
adversary system requires all lawyers to use the law instrumentally for
84. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 561, 579 (1983) (contrasting Critical Legal Studies with the "dominant styles of legal doctrine"
which feature, inter alia, "ideal purposes, policies, and principles" lending them "a semblance of
authority, necessity, and determinacy").
85. See LUBAN, supra note 30, at 18-19.
86. A variant of this explanation would be that while academic jurisprudists profess that law is
a determinate, idealist system, most practicing teachers simply do not think about jurisprudence at
all. They naturally end up treating the law as if the most minimal jurisprudence, legal realism, were
true. In this variant, there is an institutional hypocrisy resulting from a split between the academics
who think about the nature of the law and the academics who teach lawyers how to use the law.
87. See Unger, supra note 84, at 674-75 (describing most contemporary jurists as regarding
with disdain idealists who strive to recreate "objectivism and formalism"). The majority of jurists
"abased [philosophy] into an inexhaustible compendium of excuses for the truncation of legal
analysis. The social sciences they perverted into the source of argumentative ploys with which to
give arbitrary though stylized policy discussions the blessing of a specious authority." Id. at 675.
88. See DwORKiN, supra note 15, at 87-89 (explaining what Dworkin calls, in his later
writings, interpretation).
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their client.89 The client himself cannot argue, because he does not know
enough law. The other side will also have a lawyer, who will present its
best legal theory. An impartial judge will pick the best argument. We
could not be sure, the argument goes, of finding the best legal theory,
unless both sides were as ably argued for as possible.
The legal theory toolbox explanation does not account for the possi-
bility that one person can determine the law without going through the
arbitrated dialectic. If we acknowledge the possibility of determining the
law by one's self, how do we explain why a lawyer should not first try to
find the truth independent of the judge, and if successful, conform her
client's position accordingly? We can call the legal theory toolbox ex-
planation procedural skepticism; the theory that the determinate, univo-
cal nature of the law does not have confining ethical consequences, be-
cause that nature is unknowable until the end of the adversary process. If
procedural skepticism explains how legal education works, Luban's at-
tack on metaphysics will miss the real target.
A third explanation is hypocrisy. A lawyer may believe idealism is
true and know that, in fact, a good argument" for the wrong side more
often obscures the truth than reveals it. But a lawyer has a skill and needs
money. So lawyers legitimize the use of their skill by appealing to the
adversary system. The hypocrisy explanation undermines the connection
Luban wants to make between metaphysics and ethics at a more basic
level. If hypocrisy is the explanation for people's behavior, people are
ignoring what they know to be good and right for improper reasons. If
people are just bad, it does not matter whether they can appeal to meta-
physics to justify their behavior.
A fourth explanation might be called legal descriptivism. Under this
theory, law is determinate in virtue of its meaning, but that fact is mor-
ally indifferent. While it may be crystal clear that driving faster than the
speed limit is illegal, no moral significance whatsoever is attached to this
fact. Since there is no disapprobation to be attached to subverting the
law, the lawyer is free to help his client do so. This theory is particularly
plausible in connection with laws and regulations, such as the tax code,
divorced from the traditional morality of most common law torts and
crimes, which are regarded as intrinsically evil.'
A fifth explanation may be nonuniversalist ethics. If a lawyer be-
lieves in a universalist ethics where moral obligations to everyone re-
89. LUBAN, supra note 30, at 50-103 (calling this the "adversary excuse" and discussing it at
length).
90. See, e.g., Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between Morality and Law in
Modern Legal Thought, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 784, 788 (1989); Richard L. Gray, Note,
Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1374-78 (1995) (giving history of the distinction between malum in se and
malum prohibitum crimes).
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ceive equal weight, then the lawyer has difficulty in justifying privileg-
ing the ends of the client over the ends of the adversary. On the other
hand, if the lawyer believes in a kind of local communitarian ethics in
which one has tighter obligations to those closer to one than to strangers,
the adversary system is easy to justify. The lawyer may believe that du-
ties to those closest to her override any moral imperative that the law
prescribes concerning strangers. She is her client's friend and as such
owe a greater duty to him.9'
In other words, even with a legal theory that endorses an establish-
ment metaphysics and ethics, there are numerous ways that metaphysics
and ethics could relate to the actual behavior of lawyers. The straight-
forward scenario in which lawyers conform their behavior to the true
ethical theory is only one scenario among many candidates from which
to choose. Only if the practice of law is dominated by closet realism will
Luban's argument against instrumentalism be of much force in changing
lawyers' behavior. Given the multiplicity of equally plausible explana-
tions for belief in the adversary principle, even if Luban's argument does
refute closet realism, the more practically important underpinnings of the
principle of partisanship survive unscathed.
D. The Attack on Realism
Luban offers two arguments intended to show that legal realism is
false and a third argument intended to show that even a legal realism
modified enough to contain some element of determinism cannot justify
the principle of partisanship.
1. Argument 1: The Refutation of Realism
Luban's sketches his first "refutation" of realism as follows: 9'
1) "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what [is meant] by the law;" 93
therefore
2) No act is illegal if the courts can be induced to go along with it;94
therefore
3) The law is what the judge says it is;9'
91. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066, 1071 (1976).
92. LUBAN, supra note 30, at 20-21.
93. Id. at 20 ("The thesis of legal realism was stated authoritatively by Holmes thus.").




METAPHYSICAL AND ETHICAL SKEPTICISM
therefore
4) Anything a lawyer does in pursuit of the client's interests is re-
spectful of the law if it works. 96
Proposition 4 is taken to be a reductio ad absurdum of realism. If the
argument works, it refutes a metaphysical theory based on an ethical
consequence of that theory.
a. Linking Proposition I to Proposition 2
Proposition 1 is simply a restatement of Holmes' realist slogan.
Does proposition 2 follow from proposition 1? As the argument is
sketched, it does not. The sketch is an enthymeme-we must add prem-
ises that articulate a relation between the propositions. One plausible
premise is
1.1) If an act is illegal, then it is prohibited by the law.
1.1 entails
1.2) No act is illegal if it is not the case that it is prohibited by the
law.
By substitution from I we can now deduce
1.3) No act is illegal if it is not the case that it is prohibited by the
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.
1.3 is still not quite proposition 2. To get from 1.3 to proposition 2, we
must add a premise connecting the action of inducing a court to go along
with something and the prophecy that the court will go along with it. To
make the link, we can add a premise which gives content to the idea of
being prohibited by a prophecy of what the courts will do. (This is an
awkward formulation, since it is natural to speak of a law as prescriptive,
whereas a prophecy is thought of as descriptive. Nonetheless, no problem
seems to stem from this awkwardness.)
1.4) An act is prohibited by a prophecy of what the courts will do in
fact if and only if the prophecy predicts that the courts will punish the
act.
By substitution into 1.3, this yields:
1.5) No act is illegal if it is not the case that the prophecy of what the
courts will do in fact predicts that the courts will punish the act.
We may take the "prophecy" of Holmes' slogan to be a prediction
which is true.97 Hence, the slogan tells us that a body of law is the body of
96. Id. ("[F]or the realist, anything you do in pursuit of your client's interests is automatically
respectful of the law if it works.").
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the accurate predictions of the behavior of the courts. It also tells us, in the
"nothing more pretentious" clause, that Holmes regards any metaphysical
ideal content added to those predictions---content such as natural law, or
principles and policies which guide the law-as empty nonsense. Never-
theless, the rejection of ideal content does not entail the loss of the ability
to compare the action of the courts with what is predicted. There are three
possibilities when a prediction is requested about what the courts will do:
1) a true prediction is made about the courts' action; 2) a false prediction is
made; and 3) no prediction can be made. Only in case 1 is there a proph-
ecy. Hence, applying premise 1.5, we can see that by this realist definition
of the law, an act may be illegal only in case 1.
For example, we may predict that the courts will punish an act, but
then find that the courts do not. We may be mistaken because we are sur-
prised about the court's interpretation of the law, the court's interpretation
of the evidence, or some other factor, such as the court's susceptibility to
some sort of extra-legal pressure, such as bribery. Since a prophecy is a
true prediction, there was no prophecy, although we thought there was.
Going strictly by the slogan, we must say that the law, or at least the le-
gal/illegal dichotomy, failed to cover the act. Alternatively, we may not be
able to prophecy from knowledge of the law whether the courts will hold
an act legal or illegal. Perhaps the law is unclear (such as in a case of first
impression), perhaps the facts are unclear, or perhaps the susceptibility of
the courts to extra-legal pressure is unclear. Since there is no prophecy, the
slogan tells us that the act is not covered by the law.
We now see that we can describe three cases where the courts can be
induced to go along with an act: 1) the case where the court's action can be
prophesied; 2) the case where the court's action is wrongly predicted; and
3) the case where no prediction can be made. These cases support the fol-
lowing proposition:
1.6) If the courts can be induced to go along with an act, then it is not
the case that the prophecy of what the courts will do in fact predicts
that the courts will punish the act.
By transitivity from propositions 1.5 and 1.6, we can finally derive propo-
sition 2:
2) No act is illegal if the courts can be induced to go along with it.
b. Linking Proposition 2 to Proposition 3
Proposition 3 states that:
97. Again, this definition is loose. Presumably a prediction which is true at random, or for the
wrong reason, should not count as a prophecy. It should also be understood that on a realist account,
whatever is that property which makes a true prediction into a prophecy, it is not a metaphysical
property such as having a relation to a principle or a policy. Nonetheless, the truth of the prediction
is at least a necessary condition of being a prophecy.
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3) The law is what the judge says it is.
Strictly speaking, proposition 3 is in the wrong tense, because the em-
phasis of the realist definition of law that we have been considering is on
prophecy. Accordingly, proposition 3 should be modified as follows:
3.1) The law is what the judge will say it is.
As is shown above, there are three possibilities for the relation between
the law and an act. In only one of those cases, the case where we can
truly predict what the judge will say, is 3.1 true. Hence, proposition 3.1
does not follow from proposition 2. Modifying again, we obtain:
3.2) If we can truly predict what the judge will say, the law is what
the judge will say it is.
In his sketch of this argument, Luban criticizes proposition 3 by
appealing to our unreflective moral views of its consequences." These
criticisms do not hold up against the weaker proposition 3.2 that is actu-
ally derivable from the argument. Luban imagines the court may be in-
duced by bribery or threats to decide in favor of some party, even though
that party has committed a plainly "illegal" act." He believes that in this
situation the legal realist is compelled to say, contrary to hypothesis, that
the act was legal.
For the act to be plainly illegal, according to the legal realist defini-
tion of illegality given by Luban, there must be something that would
allow one to predict, all else being equal, that the courts would punish
the act. We can imagine three cases in which bribery protects an actor
from punishment, using the three possible relations between a law and an
act. In case 1, the legal realist sees the act and the law, and prophesies
that the court will hold the actor liable. In case 2, the legal realist prophe-
sies that the court will not hold the actor liable. In case 3, the legal realist
would not be able to prophesy.
In case 1, the legal realist's prediction is undone by the court's cor-
ruption. Going by the legal realist slogan, here we must say that the law
failed to cover the act."' This description does not seem repugnant. Cor-
ruption derailed the law and prevented it from applying here. The idealist
would disagree, saying that the law did cover the act, but was not ad-
ministered by the courts. There is a difference of emphasis in the de-
scriptions-the realist paying more attention to what happens in the
world, the idealist caring more about text and intentions. This different
98. LUBAN, supra note 30, at 21.
99. Id.
100. Holmes' slogan distinguishes his brand of legal realism from the operationalism of Black
and Ross, or Hart's positivism. See Black, supra note 74, at 107-08; Hart, supra note 5; Ross, supra
note 75. Those scholars could choose to say that the language of the law picked out a class of
actions, such that the law did cover those actions. It is intelligible for them to say that the court's
corruption undermined the clear meaning of the law.
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emphasis should not offend unreflective moral opinion; hence, it does
not refute the realist. The realist is not forced to say that whatever act the
court fails to punish is legal.
In case 2, we can imagine that the legal realist knows the law and
the act committed, and knows that if the courts operated impervious to
offers of bribery, they would punish the act. Nevertheless, the realist also
knows the operation of these courts, and knows that the defendant will
bribe the judge and get off. Only in this case is the realist forced by his
slogan to Luban's suggested conclusion that the act is legal.
In case 3, the realist is unable to prophesy. We can imagine that this
is a world in which some judges are corrupt, and some are not, and it is
impossible to tell who is what. Thus, neither the realist nor the actor
knows, when the act is committed, whether a court will punish the act.
The realist will have to say the law does not cover the act. Again the ap-
praisal seems inoffensive. In case 3, no act is categorically forbidden.
What happens in any particular case depends completely on what kind of
judge one is assigned. The idealist might say that the act is illegal, but
one can never tell whether the judge will be corrupt. This idealist for-
mulation fails to stress the law's failure here. If one can never predict the
way the law will be applied, there is in a sense no law-like regularity. In
any case, the difference of emphasis in case 3 does not refute the realist
either.
For case 2, the only case rendering the first clause of proposition 3.2
true, we can now examine if proposition 3 is repugnant. Proposition 3
states that the law is what the judge says it is.'"' Let us suppose that the
act in question is murder, and the judge is bribed to direct a verdict, say-
ing there is not enough evidence for the prosecution to prove its case.
Again, there are three possibilities. Considered absent the bribery, either
there clearly was a winning prosecution case, there clearly was not a
winning prosecution case, or it is not clear whose case wins. If there
clearly was not a winning prosecution case, the judge made the right
decision, though for the wrong reason. In the other two cases, the judge
may be making the wrong decision. Luban would want to say that when
the court makes the wrong decision it has "said" that murder was legal.
Luban would argue, therefore, that proposition 3 is false, since murder is
illegal.
The attempt to suggest that proposition 3 is false moves too fast. On
closer examination, we can see that this attempt reveals a general flaw in
101. LUaAN, supra note 30, at 20-21. Strictly speaking, this formulation is a betrayal of realist
principles. It would be more accurate to say that "the law is what the judge orders." It is a familiar
phenomenon that an opinion will give lip service to some legal principle and then, by categorizing
facts in an extreme manner, vitiate that principle in practice. For example, the judge might say that
consideration is necessary to enforce a contract, and then grant relief where consideration is merely
nominal or on a promissory estoppel theory.
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appealing to unreflective moral opinion. In looking at these examples, we
are implicitly dealing with six categories: legal, moral, this world, the
world of the hypothetical case, description, and prescription. We may
take it as true that murder is illegal in this world and that murder is im-
moral in both this world and the world in case 3. By hypothesis, murder
is legal in case 2, according to the description of realist jurisprudence.
Realist jurisprudence is silent, however, on the question of the morality
of murder and on the question whether murder ought to be legal in the
world in case 2. It is only by the covert conflation of the categories of
morality and illegality, and of description and prescription, that we can
generate an unreflective moral opinion that the realist description of
murder as legal in case 2 is repugnant (based on the unarticulated and
false view that the realist is in favor of murder in this world). '°
In short, case 2 is again indicative of the realist emphasis on the
world rather than on intentions. If we actually imagine a world in which
anyone with enough money to bribe a judge can commit otherwise 'ille-
gal acts', and everyone knows it, there is a certain truth to be gained by
refusing to call those acts illegal in this system. For example, it is a fa-
miliar charge that there is a different law in this country for the rich and
powerful than for the poor and powerless. If one holds this view, one
gains descriptive and rhetorical force by saying that it is not illegal in this
country for a rich man to kill his wife, but only for a poor man to do so.
On the other hand, in the face of the realization that the courts will not
punish this act, there is something hypocritical about nevertheless as-
serting that the act is illegal in our system. Again, the emphasis is differ-
ent. The realist will say: This act is legal in this jurisdiction, because it is
not subject to any punishment. The idealist will say: This act is illegal in
this jurisdiction even though it is never subject to punishment. There
does not seem to be anything universally repugnant to unreflective moral
opinion in the realist description.
c. Linking Proposition 3 to Proposition 4
Having qualified the scope of proposition 3 and assessed its impli-
cations, we now come to proposition 4: Anything a lawyer does in pur-
suit of the client's interests is respectful of the law if it works.' 3 Respect
is a notion that is foreign to the system of propositions we have been
working out. Hence, nothing in the realist theory explicitly says one way
or another whether one should respect the law, as Luban believes, or
whether an action may be interpreted as respecting or disrespecting the
law. The notion of respect refers to the value we place on an institution.
The addition of a proposition concerning respect marks the explicit in-
troduction of an evaluative or moral term to Luban's discussion.
102. Luban may, of course, wish to deny the descriptive/prescriptive distinction made by the
legal positivist, but he gives us no reason to go along with him.
103. LuBAN, supra note 30, at 21.
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There does seem to be an implicit argument from proposition 3 to
proposition 4. We might reconstruct the argument by adding a defini-
tional premise about respect:'
4.1) If a lawyer's act aids the judge in deciding the case in accord
with the law, it respects the law.
Since by 3, whatever the judge says is the law, if 4.1 is true, then 4 must
be true. If what the lawyer does works, it aids the judge in the decision,
which was the law. Nevertheless, since proposition 4.1 defines respect in
terms of results according with the law, rather than defining respect in
terms of conduct or process, proposition 4.1 cannot be advanced by the
idealist. As we have mentioned, it may well happen that despite the
bribe, the defendant really did deserve a directed verdict. Hence, by an
idealist criterion, the lawyer's bribe aided the court in getting this correct
result. By 4.1, the idealist should therefore conclude that the lawyer's
bribe respected the law. But this is precisely what Luban is arguing
against. Therefore Luban must agree that 4.1 is false.
Alternatively, Luban may try to derive proposition 4 through the use
of some intermediate definitional criterion that links respect of the law
with legal procedures. Nevertheless, since disrespectful conduct may still
be legal, and since, in the example of bribery, the disrespectful conduct is
by stipulation accepted by the court, the definition cannot appeal to what
legal procedures the court will accept.
If Luban does not define respect in terms of what acts the court will
accept, he eliminates the link between "respect" and legal realism's crite-
rion for law. For example, suppose the definition included a list of ac-
tivities that might be undertaken, consistent with respect for the law, to
help the client. All other activities would be disrespectful. Bribery
would, of course, be omitted from the list and hence be disrespectful.
Since this definition has as a consequence that bribery is disrespectful of
the law, it could not be used to imply the result that bribery was respect-
ful. Since this definition implies nothing about whether the court accepts
bribery, it cannot be inconsistent with the realist definition of law.
In short, in constructing a proposition 4.1 that can be used to deduce
proposition 4, Luban must be careful that the proposition is not so broad
that it implies that an idealist might say, depending on the example, that
bribery respected the law. In addition, he must be careful that the propo-
sition is not so narrow that it would force a realist to say that the bribery
in this example was disrespectful. Unfortunately, Luban cannot escape
this dilemma. Since respect is not a term of the realist theory, Luban
must define respect independently of that theory. If he gives a definition
of respect which refers to legal results, and thereby makes the necessary
104. See id.
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link between the definition of respect and the realist criterion of law, an
example can be found that makes the definition of respect repugnant to
an idealist theory. On the other hand, if he gives an example based on
process, one which will be consistent with idealist theory, the definition
will have no point of intersection with the results-oriented formulation of
legal realism. The definition, therefore, will allow the realist to agree
with the idealist that acts like bribery are always disrespectful, regardless
of the court's response to those acts.
2. Argument 2: Introducing Value Terms to Realism
Luban does not acknowledge the idealist's inability to come up with
a suitable definition for "respect" to use as a club against the realist. In-
stead Luban declares victory for his argument 5 and forges on, trying to
"fix" realism so that the "damaging" argument from respect for the law
cannot affect it. He does so by attempting to modify proposition 3. In
place of proposition 3, he substitutes:
3') "[The] law is what the judge says it is except when she is illegally
influenced."' 6
This proposition is incompatible with realism, since it is a denial of the
simple Holmesian realism Luban has been attacking. Nevertheless, Lu-
ban may feel it is an appropriate suggestion, because the proposition does
not add any new entities to the law, but still relies on seemingly opera-
tionalist definitions of the law--descriptions of the court's behavior. The
new criterion is illegal influence, a natural choice, because we suppose
that the judge has been influenced by bribery. Luban argues that this
modified definition of law is circular, because it uses the concept of ille-
gal influence, yet the judge herself is the person that says whether the
influence is illegal.
In fact, the definition need not be circular on a sufficiently compli-
cated model of the legal system. Up to this point, we have been using a
simple model in which we implicitly imagined that there was only one
judge and one court. This model has worked fine with all prior examples,
but the new proposition 3' shows an important discrepancy between this
model and a more complex model. If we imagine a model more like the
real world, in which there are multiple courts with the capacity to check
each other's conduct, then we can give operational content to the concept
of illegal influence beyond reference to the behavior of any single judge.
For example, we could rephrase proposition 3' as:
3'.1) The prophesies of what the courts will do in fact are what the
judge says they are except when the judge is influenced by an act that
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Proposition 3.1 is an operational definition that maps the way our
courts now deal with illegal influence. Illegal influence is identified by
getting another court to assess the suspect judge's behavior.
Hence, Luban's objection is not as powerful as it at first seems. The
definition of law can be made on a more sophisticated model to refer to
the courts, not the individual judge. In such a model, the opinion of one
judge only does not make the law. It is the final opinion of the system
that counts. The realist construction of "illegal influence" would concern
whether we could prophesy that the judge before whom the charge of
illegality was presented would punish the act. While Luban's suggestion
points out a problem with the model, the problem is not with the realist
aspect of the model, but rather that the model only contains one judge. In
sum, the realist account of "illegal influence" may be sufficiently robust
to avoid Luban's charge of circularity.
Nonetheless, since Luban takes 3' to be refuted by the circularity
objection, he suggests another criterion:
3") "[The] law is what the judge says it is when she is interpreting it
in good faith."' '
The new criterion introduces the evaluative notion of good faith. The
criterion is not as apparently circular as the appeal to legality, but Luban
nevertheless finds a circularity problem. According to Luban, 3" is ulti-
mately vacuous, because a judge interpreting the law in good faith must,
according to the realist, use the realist definition of law. Thus the judge
must sit down and try to prophesy what she will do. This activity can
lead nowhere."
In this argument Luban makes a crucial category mistake"9 which
leads to a leap of logic in his analysis of the good faith definition of law.
Realism is a metaphysics of the law, a theory of what sort of ideal, onto-
logical, or logical status rules of law have. Law itself is a separate thing,
the item studied, not the activity of studying. Similarly, biology is the
study of living things, but living things are not a science or a study, they
are entities (capable of) existing and behaving independent of anyone
studying them. There is no reason to suppose that the judge described in
legal realist theory must herself believe that theory. Luban conflates the
realist study of law with the object of that study, the judge and the judi-
cial system. The realist definition of law says nothing about the meta-
physical views of actual judges. The realist would take his definition of
law to apply equally well to any legal system, even one staffed by ideal-
ists.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 22-23.
109. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16-18 (1949).
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Secondly, even were the judge a realist, it does not follow that her
good faith deliberation would be an empty attempt to predict her own
behavior. Such a claim confuses a metaphysics of law with a decision
procedure for individual cases, two quite different things."' For example,
the definition of automobile might be "four wheeled vehicle propelled by
an internal combustion engine." That definition is definitely not an algo-
rithm for constructing a car, and would aid one very little in a good faith
effort to do so. On the other hand, a detailed instruction book on how to
make an individual car would not constitute a definition of the automo-
bile. (There are many different kinds of cars which are made in many
different ways. A specification for building a Formula One race car
would not cover a Volvo station wagon, but both are covered under any
satisfactory definition of car.) In short, the realist judge would be free to
engage in whatever decision procedure she deemed appropriate.'
At this point Luban would say that if you allow the judge a decision
procedure-reasoning-then you are admitting, after all, that the law has
an ideal structure accessible through reason. That is, what the judge is
doing is reasoning about the law, and the result of her reasoning is the
discovery of the law. Moreover, in order to prophesy what the judge will
do, one need only anticipate the judge's reasoning. Realism appears to be
stood on its head-prophecy drops out as an empty notion to be replaced
by the ideal reasoning the realist had rejected as pretentious."2
The argument moves too fast. Several things must be true for this
idealist reduction of realism to work. First, it must be the case that all or
most judges reason according to the idealist theory. In that case, and in
that case only, the realist lawyer, in prophesying the judge's opinion,
would merely reason out the law on his own, according to the correct
theory. If, on the other hand, there were many different judges believing
in many different theories, the lawyer would want to know which par-
ticular theory each individual judge holds. The lawyer would have to do
more than reason according to the one true theory; therefore, the realist
prophecy of the law would diverge from any one idealist view.
Second, reasoning according to some idealist theory of the law must
actually constitute a univocal decision procedure in real cases. Luban
appeals to the reasoning outlined in the judicial opinion as in fact being
that decision procedure. The realist would emphatically deny Luban's
claim, arguing that all legal theories are hopelessly indeterminate and
cannot be used to arrive at a unique answer for each case. The reasoning
110. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 66, at 845-46 (discussing forces that might drive judicial
decisions, including economic forces, aesthetic ideals, and political bias).
111, See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 376 (1983)
(recommending that the lawyer bring out the true socioeconomic and political foundations of legal
disputes); Unger, supra note 84, at 667-68.
112. LimAN, supra note 30, at 24.
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in the opinion may serve to legitimate the judge's decision, but cannot
have necessitated it. So even if all judges did happen to hold the same
theory, the realist would argue that the theory did not completely deter-
mine the judges' decisions, and that there was something more to proph-
esy than mere theory-as-decision-procedure manipulation.
There are at least two ways indeterminacy can leak into a theory.
One is on the formal level. A determinist theory must have rules tight
enough to entail a unique answer for any case that can be posed to it. The
second--on the practical level-is the application of the theory to facts.
A determinist theory must be grounded in a sufficiently comprehensive
practice under the theory so that any set of facts can be resolved into a
unique theoretical description. Luban demands that the law be "univocal,
rigid, self-explanatory, and uncontroversial,""' 3 just to avoid these two
kinds of indeterminacy, but it is hard to see how the law can be made
"univocal, rigid, self-explanatory, and uncontroversial.""' Formal inde-
terminacy is simply a condition with which all systems of knowledge
must contend. Completeness and consistency are the two paramount cri-
teria of determinacy for formal systems."' A formal system is incomplete
if the formal system is not powerful enough to account for all the facts in
the domain of the theory."6 It is inconsistent if its decision procedure
decides some cases in two contradictory ways."' No formalization of
arithmetic is both complete and consistent."' If formalizations of arithm-
113. Id. at 18.
114. Id.
115. These criteria derive from what is known as Hilbert's Program, an effort to provide a
foundation for mathematics in logic. See Wilfrid Sieg, Consistency, in THE CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 59, at 155; Mary Tiles, Philosophy of Mathematics, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PmLOSOPHY 325, 346-47 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James eds.,
1996).
116. More precisely, a formal system is deductively complete when, for every set of sentences,
every logical consequence of that set of sentences is derivable from that set of sentences using the
formal system. See George F. Schumm, Completeness, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 59, at 141. We may regard a legal theory as having two parts, a description
of what counts as legal decision making and a set of sentences setting forth the law. In a formally
complete legal theory, every legal consequence from a set of sentences describing a state of affairs
should be derivable from the legal decision making process described in the theory plus the
sentences in the theory setting forth the law.
117. See Sieg, supra note 115. More precisely, a set of statements is consistent relative to a
formal system if one cannot derive a contradiction from the set of sentences using the formal system.
A legal theory itself will be inconsistent if a contradiction is derivable, using the legal decision
making process set forth by the theory, from nothing more than the set of sentences in the theory that
set forth the law.
118. See Godel, supra note 72. The incompleteness of any formalized system of arithmetic
arises from the impossibility of stating a formalization of arithmetic that avoids self-reference. See
Tiles, supra note 115, at 347-48. It is possible to formalize simple systems, such as the classical
logic of sentences or the classical logic of sentences and predicates, without self-reference. See Sieg,
supra note 115, at 155. These systems are complete and consistent. A theory of law that contained
within itself meta-legal propositions such as "Whenever the positive law gives out, the judge should
refer to principles," and "In every case where the judge is referring to principles and the principles
seem to conflict, the judge should assign the principles different weights and follow the weightier
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etic are indeterminate, it seems highly unlikely that the much vaguer
field of law is formally determinate. Moreover, once we realize that even
as rigorous a field as arithmetic is indeterminate, we can see that we need
not take the charge of indeterminacy as an invidious criticism of the law,
but simply as a recognition of the nature of some complicated systems.
Factual indeterminacy is a phenomenon with which all practitioners
are familiar. No matter how much detail is written into a law, it cannot
contain within itself its own interpretation. "9 At some stage, some practi-
tioner, whether a lawyer or a judge, must look at the law and at a fact
pattern, and make the decision as to whether the fact pattern falls under
the terms of the law. The law may contain vague "fudge" words like
"reasonable" that invite argument over meaning, or more precise words
like "pipe" that seemingly leave little room for dispute. No matter, a case
will always come up that does not quite fit accepted usage-the hard
case for the legal positivist."0 In these cases the (existing positive) law
does not determine how it is to be applied to the facts.
Even if one grants, like H.L.A. Hart, that there are easy cases com-
pletely determined by the theory, it still does not follow that the judge's
decisional procedure would be the best prophecy procedure. David Sha-
piro's article on Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence eloquently makes this
point.'2' Although Rehnquist's opinions will contain the appropriate doc-
trinal argument about federalism, equal protection, and so forth, Shapiro
was able to formulate a more concise realist description of the law in
Rehnquist's hands. For example, Shapiro predicts that Rehnquist's
holdings would follow the rule: "Conflicts between an individual and the
government should, whenever possible, be resolved against the individ-
ual."'22 Even if Rehnquist actually thinks through his legitimating doc-
trine before issuing a decision, that doctrine drops out of the realist cal-
culus.
In his more recent writings, Ronald Dworkin has attempted to solve
the problem of indeterminacy by invoking the theory, discussed above in
connection with the fact/value distinction, that language is best described
as consisting of practices and institutions.'23 Dworkin hopes to exploit the
principle," would seem to have enough complexity that either inconsistency or incompleteness
would be difficult to avoid.
119. See, e.g., WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 23, §§ 143-149,
222, at 56-69, 86.
120. See HART, supra note 77, at 135.
121. David Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
122. Id. at 294.
123. It is sometimes unclear, in Law's Empire, whether Dworkin really rejects skepticism about
law's determinacy, since his theory of interpretation could be taken as an attempt to describe how
lawyers think about the law in the absence of determinate guidelines. Nevertheless, Dworkin always
comes back to insisting that the position that there "is never one right way, only different ways, to
decide a hard case... is either a serious philosophical mistake.., or... a contentious political
position resting on dubious political convictions..." DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 412.
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institutional method of attacking the fact/value distinction by attempting
to describe a legal practice analogous to promising-the practice of in-
terpretation-and distinguishing between internal and external skepti-
cism of that institution.'24 Dworkin claims that the task of the lawyer is
interpretation, an intrinsically value-laden project of "imposing purpose
on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example
of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong."'25 Dworkin's idea is
that, while it is true that one does not need to accept an institution to
criticize it, external criticism of an institution is somehow ineffective.
Dworkin's presentation is rather unclear, but his external/internal skepti-
cal distinction appears to be analogous to the following sort of skepti-
cism. An external skeptic of Euclidean geometry doubts that it is objec-
tively true. An internal skeptic doubts that any, or certain, theorems can
be derived within Euclidean geometry. Dworkin wants to ignore the first
sort of skeptic, roughly on the grounds that, while we are engaged in a
practice, we just do it, we do not step outside it and judge it.'26 Ignoring
the external skeptic in this way cannot solve the problem of indetermi-
nacy.
Suppose the positivist is the skeptic. The positivist believes that in
some cases the law is clear, while in other, hard cases, there is "no right
answer." Is the positivist an external or an internal skeptic? As to the
easy cases, the positivist is neither. He would probably not disagree with
Dworkin's description of how a judge determined the law, and if he did,
not much would hang on the disagreement. Moreover, the positivist
would believe, based on linguistic facts independent of Dworkin's the-
ory, that the judge's assertion of the law was objectively true. In the hard
case, the positivist would be both an internal and an external skeptic. The
positivist would not accept that the interpretive method could identify
one answer as right, so the positivist would be an internal skeptic.
Moreover, the positivist would not believe that there is an "objective"
answer somehow "out there," even though our methods for finding an-
swers give out in hard cases, so the positivist is an external skeptic.
These two skepticisms are thematically (although not logically) related-
if one believes there is a reality somehow independent of and underlying
the practice of reasoning about the law, one has reason to have hope that
however confused things may look in practice, over the years we will be
able to come closer and closer to that reality. On the other hand, if one
believes, like the skeptic, that law is just a practice or convention, there is
no reason to believe, contrary to appearances, that at some point in the
future we must be able, finally, to discover the real answers.
124. Id. at 82-86.
125. Id. at 52.
126. Id. at 83 ("The practices of interpretation and morality give these claims all the meaning
they need or could have.").
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Another way of seeing the force of external skepticism is to reflect
on Dworkin's claim that "[t]he practices of interpretation and morality
give these claims all the meaning they need or could have."'27 In some
sense, this is an uncontroversial claim for a conventionalist or a holist
concerning linguistic theory to make. Yet this claim does not do what the
idealist needs it to do. Consider another practice: workers in a gang put-
ting down sandbags to reenforce a levee. Jones yells "Bag!" Smith hands
Jones a sandbag. Jones lays the sandbag along the levee. Jones yells
"Bag!" Here the practice of Smith and Jones gives "Bag!" all the mean-
ing it needs or could have. We stipulate that sandbags, the levee, and
Smith and Jones exist, so there is no place for external skepticism.
Nonetheless, this practice is open to external skepticism analogous to the
skepticism of the legal positivist. For what happens if Jones yells "Bag!"
even though he can see that Smith has no more bags? What happens if
Jones whispers "Bag"? What happens if Smith slides the bag along the
ground instead of handing it to Jones? We cannot say. These actions are
not already included in the pre-existing practice.'28 The claim that an ac-
tion is not already included in the pre-existing practice is precisely the
claim that skeptics about hard cases make about the law.
Finally, Dworkin claims that interpretation is not only a practice,
but it is, in fact, a "constructive" practice.'" Presumably, a "constructive"
practice may be immune from skepticism that any particular instance of
the practice is not "already a part of" the practice, since the whole point
of the practice is to construct. The game of chess may be considered a
constructive practice. Every game is new-no game is played until the
moves are made. Different ideas can be tried out. Players will disagree
about whether the ideas are good. Players will give reasons to one an-
other in the form of move and counter-move. The dispute will be settled
over the board. Someone might claim that there is no "right answer" to
the question of whether a certain sequence of opening moves is decent.
That claim would be internal skepticism about chess. Yet over a series of
games using that line of moves it will become apparent ' ° whether that
line of moves favors neither side or advantages Black or White to some
degree. There are two features of the practice of chess that make this
kind of judgment possible. First, chess has rules that determine what
moves can be made. Second, chess has rules that determine whether a
game is over, and if so whether White has won, Black has won, or the
game is a draw. The internal skeptic about interpretation simply doubts
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., WrrIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 23, § 68, at 32-33
("'But then the use of the word is unregulated, the "game" we play with it is unregulated.'-It is not
everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball
in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too.").
129. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 52-53.
130. In reality, chess is such an extraordinarily complex game that relatively few such questions
are settled in practice.
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whether we can identify such hard and fast rules for "reasoning" about
the law.
In sum, just as a notion of respect is compatible (although external)
to a realist theory so are notions of illegal influence and good faith.
Moreover, the realist is not trapped by use of these notions into admitting
that there must, after all, be an idealist decision procedure, because the
realist metaphysic is not itself committed to any particular decision pro-
cedure and the idealist cannot show that an idealist decision procedure is
determinate in all cases.
3. Argument 3: The Principle of Partisanship
Nevertheless, Luban believes he has shown that the illegal influence
and good faith suggestions must somehow be circular. Luban next argues
that the realist, in claiming that the judge's good faith interpretation of
the law is the law, no matter what that interpretation is (believed by Lu-
ban to be a consequence of the circularity argument), is giving himself a
false justification for the principle of partisanship. The argument is as
follows:
1) If my [the lawyer's] good faith interpretation of the law differs
from the judge's, it is the judge's interpretation that is correct;
therefore
2) 1 should be agnostic about the law;
therefore
3) There is nothing illegitimate about promoting the point of view
most consistent with my client's interests;1
3 '
therefore
4) Since I am my client's agent, I should adopt the principle of parti-
sanship, that I must, within the established constraints of professional
behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client will prevail.'32
While Luban does not believe this is a valid argument,'33 he does not
recognize that the flaws in the argument allow a realist, as well as an
idealist, to disavow the principle of partisanship.
a. Proposition 1
Luban wants to say that the argument is unsound because realism is
false. Luban assumes that realism is false, that there is one true theory of
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the law, and also one true decision procedure. He therefore contends that
proposition 1 is false, because the judge may actually be interpreting the
law in bad faith. ' If the judge interprets the law in bad faith, he would
not be following Luban's idealist decision procedure. On the other hand,
the mere fact that the judge decides for whom to hold in a frivolous or
unethical way does not mean that the legitimating rhetoric the judge uses
in his opinion will be inconsistent with established law. There is a dis-
tinction between how a decision is made and whether it is correct. Even
if there is a decision procedure that will yield a correct result, whether
the result is correct is a separate issue from whether the decision proce-
dure was followed, or the result reached by happenstance. Even if a
judge acts in bad faith, the ruling may be correct. Hence, proposition 1 is
not necessarily false, even if the judge is assumed to be acting in bad
faith. and an idealist theory is assumed to be true.
Moreover, viewed against the backdrop of the more sophisticated
legal realist model discussed above, in which the decision is deemed to
be the decision of the entire court system, not just one judge and one
court, proposition 1 does not seem that implausible. For example, no
matter how fervently one may believe that Hans v. Louisiana'5 inter-
preted the Eleventh Amendment in bad faith, and in flagrant contradic-
tion to the plain language of the amendment, since the federal judiciary
has followed Hans since it came down, it is perfectly reasonable to assert
that the Hans case is the law. Likewise, any other holding consistently
followed by the entire judicial system is the positive law, regardless of its
theoretical justification or the manner in which it was reached.
b. Linking Proposition 1 to Proposition 2
Luban wishes to show that the bad conclusion of proposition 4 is
necessarily derived from the error of embracing the false proposition 1.
Hence, Luban wants to bridge the gap from an "is" to an "ought," by
showing that proposition 2 follows from proposition 1. Whether I should
be agnostic about the law is a matter of ethical or prudential principles
applied to my beliefs about the world. Hence, a realist who believes
proposition 1 might nevertheless believe that lawyers' good faith inter-
pretations of the law tally with judges' interpretations often enough that,
as a matter of practical advantage, the lawyer is better off predicting the
law accurately most of the time and being wrong some of the time, than
being an agnostic.
To link proposition 1 with proposition 2, Luban may have some
skeptical argument in mind such as the following. Whatever theory I use
to predict what the law may be, I may be wrong, since the judge may
disagree with me. Since whatever I think about the law may be wrong, I
134. Id.
135. 134 U.S. I (1890).
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do not know anything about the law for certain. Since I do not know
anything about the law for certain, I should be agnostic since it would be
lying about my state of knowledge to assert the truth of a legal proposi-
tion. While this argument is consistent, it is based on an extreme skepti-
cism-that unless I "know for certain," I cannot rely on my opinions. We
may contrast this attitude with that of a scientist who only provisionally
accepts even the most well-confirmed theory, pending potential experi-
mental or observational disconfirmation. The scientist does not remain
practically agnostic about the provisionally accepted theory, but acts on
it and builds on it, unless and until it is disconfirmed.
Nevertheless, it is natural for Luban to set up extreme skepticism as
the adversary position, because he believes he has a ready-made reply.
Luban believes that law must be "self-explanatory."'" In Luban's model,
law is not like science, but like logic. The idealist can adduce the' law
through reason and hence know what the law is, independent of the
judge. Luban's model leaves no purchase for the most extreme skeptic.
The extreme remedy (requiring law to be "self-explanatory") is not
necessary to address extreme skepticism. There are many tenable posi-
tions for both the idealist and the realist that lie in between the extremes.
Hence, the agnosticism of proposition 2 is not a necessary consequence
of proposition 1.
c. Linking Proposition 2 to Proposition 3
Proposition 3 does not follow directly from proposition 2. Another
evaluative premise or set of premises is needed to bridge the gap. One
premise is needed to flesh out the meaning of "illegitimate." If "illegiti-
mate" is taken to be synonymous with unethical, a whole set of premises
is needed to bridge the gap from lack of belief about the law to lack of
ethical responsibility for the client's interests. To see this, all we need do
is reflect that seemingly the sole relevant propositions entailed by propo-
sition 2 are:
Proposition 2') I should be agnostic about whether my client's inter-
ests are inconsistent with the law;
and
Proposition 2") In advocating my client's position, I am not know-
ingly advocating a position inconsistent with the law.
It seems at first glance unobjectionable to maintain that it is unethical for
a lawyer to knowingly advocate a position inconsistent with the law, so
agnosticism saves a lawyer from one type of unethical conduct associ-
ated with partisanship.
136. LuBAN, supra note 30, at 18.
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The most direct opposition to the principle of partisanship comes
from the theory of role morality that holds one morally accountable for
the interests of one's clients (at least if one is directly and knowingly
working to advance those interests). Luban refers to this theory in his
discussion of the case of the wicked uncle.'37 This theory is indifferent to
the happenstance that a client's intermediate goal, for example, that a
suspected murderer be prosecuted,'38 is legal, so long as the motive or end
result is morally suspect. In the case of the wicked uncle, the morally
suspect goal of depriving an heir of his inheritance seems to outweigh
that lawful act of prosecuting a man for murder on the basis of colorable
evidence that he committed the crime. This theory is perfectly consistent
with the realist agnosticism about the law posited by Luban. An agnostic
view about the law need not be an agnostic about the morality of one's
interests. Therefore, Luban's attacks on the principle of partisanship fail
to show any necessary moral deficiency in the extreme realist/skeptical
position he sets up as an adversary.
VI. INDETERMINIST ETHICS
In general, the idealist's need to attack skepticism rests on an un-
willingness to appeal to principles of morality separate from law when
giving an account of the role of law in society. Luban's need to attack
realism rests on his unwillingness to appeal to principles of morality ex-
plicitly independent from a theory of law in his account of professional
ethics. If Luban would allow for a morality independent of law, he would
have an independent platform for assessing the role morality of the law-
yer. Luban introduces the value of respect for the law, but he makes that
value parasitic upon the notion of law itself. His notion of a "generality
requirement" to be placed on law is itself value neutral, since it calls for
the law to be generally beneficial. "9 Therefore any substantive value
system specifying what is beneficial may be used to supply substance to
the "general benefit" requirement.
Since Luban does not want to use substantively moral premises to
attack the principle of partisanship, he is forced to use the only other kind
of premises at hand, namely premises describing the legal/metaphysical
world. Luban strives to bridge the is/ought gap to argue that a false
metaphysics is responsible for a troubling ethical theory. Such a method-
ology unfairly dismisses an interesting metaphysical theory (legal real-
ism) and fails to uncover the valid (substantive ethical) reasons we may
have to oppose the principle of partisanship.
137. Id. at 3-10; see also id. at 6 (Burroughs' cross-examination of Gifford). In the case of the
wicked uncle, the heir to a stolen estate returned from America to England. Id. at 3. Unfortunately,
the heir shot a man to death after his return. Id. The man that had wrongfully taken title to the estate
instructed his lawyer to prosecute the returning rightful heir for murder. Id. Of course the real goal of
the usurper was not to see justice done, but to retain the wrongfully obtained title to the estate.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 30, 43-49.
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Looking at the attitudes of actual realist and critical scholars to-
wards the law and the lawyer's role shows that idealists either misunder-
stand or misdescribe the moral concerns of skeptics, labeling skeptics as
nihilists.'" Contrary to critics such as Dworkin who misleadingly accuse
legal skeptics of moving "toward a new mystification in service of un-
disclosed political goals,"'4 ' legal skeptics have been quite vocal about
their political goals. Legal skeptics advance the indeterminacy thesis not
because they lack moral feeling, but precisely because they feel that a
determinate, univocal theory of law deprives legal practice of its moral
content. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the source of Luban's definition of
realism, argued that the common law grows through the court's legisla-
tive considerations of "what is expedient for the community
concerned."' 2 Holmes argued for a "more conscious recognition of the
legislative function of the courts,"' 3 which would lead to more self-
consciously moral argument. Similarly, the realist Felix Cohen criticized
the then dominant formalist jurisprudence on the ground that "[i]ts actual
effect is to exclude the conscious consideration of ethical issues from the
judicial mind and to lend weight to the unconscious and uncritized value
standards by which judges decided what they ought to do."'" Cohen
complained that formalism substitutes logical consistency for true ethical
standards and advocated a self-conscious consideration of morality in
judicial decision making." These realist thinkers mixed metaphysics and
ethics as much as the idealists, but with an important difference. They
did not pretend that any ethics followed from their conception of the law.
Rather they made room in their conception of the law for a consideration
of morality derived independently of legal theory.
Critical legal studies scholars also attempt to inject moral consid-
erations into legal reasoning. Peter Gabel and Paul Harris have a three
step recommendation for lawyers to deal with the legal system: 1) "de-
velop a relation of genuine equality... with the client"; 2) "demysti[fy]
the symbolic authority of the State" as exemplified through the trappings
of the law; and 3) reshape the way the law represents conflicts, bringing
out "the true socioeconomic and political foundations of legal
disputes."'"M While grounded in an explicit disrespect of the law and its
dominant idealogy, these recommendations are profoundly moral in their
tone and argue for an ethical commitment far greater, if far different,
than that of the ordinary lawyer. Roberto Unger, perhaps the leading
voice for societal transformation in the critical school, offers similar sug-
gestions, desiring to "transform legal doctrine into one more area for
140. See supra text accompanying notes 1-19.
141. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 275.
142. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
143. Id. at 36.
144. Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201,214 (1931).
145. Id. at 220.
146. Gabel & Harris, supra note 111, at 376.
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continuing the fight over the right and possible forms of social life."'47
The transformation will take place through an "internal development" in
which the ideal conflicts of law are exploited to transform the actual law
bit by bit, first changing the law, then revising ideal conceptions in light
of that change, then working for more change.'"
The point of these examples is not that the left-wing social ethics of
critical legal scholars are superior, but rather that these ethics are consis-
tent with critical metaphysics, while being inconsistent with, and hostile
to, nihilism in general and the principle of partisanship in particular. In
short, it turns out that these skeptical scholars may not fit into the anti-
establishment schema described above. On closer inspection, these
scholars join a skeptical metaphysics with a nonskeptical ethics that re-
quires lawyers to make moral judgments and take responsibility for their
actions in serving their clients.
Luban could have expressed his ethical concerns in more "realist"
language, but doing so would have forced him to introduce values extrin-
sic to the law. The first notion he needs is the law as it should be. Each
realist lawyer is entitled to have that notion. The notion could be the pro-
visional, ever subject to revision, notion of ideal morality that Unger
favors, or a more traditional, static ideal morality. The second necessary
notion is the relation between the law as it should be and the law as it
actually is. Finally, Luban needs role-specific notions such as the notions
that the lawyer should be loyal to his client and the citizen should be
loyal to society. The realist lawyer's role conflicts may get worked out
among these conflicting values. Luban's ethical theory could then be
reconstructed. The law as it should be would provide the (as close as
possible) univocal theory of true morality, the realization of which is the
lawyer's goal. The lawyer would attempt to realize the true morality by
working through the law as it is, pulling it and pushing it at the margins
to be ever closer to its ideal form. As an agent for his client, the lawyer
will be loyal, representing only those clients whose problems require that
he work to effect morally beneficial change.
It is no accident that a skeptical reconstruction of an "idealist" ethics
sounds a lot like the recommendations of Gabel and Harris, or Unger.
Both legal realism and Critical Legal Studies are critical movements, and
a critical movement is at heart a moral enterprise. The idealist's error is
to identify a lack of intellectual respect for a certain style of legal theory
with a lack of moral sensibility.
147. Unger, supra note 84, at 579.
148. Id. at 580.
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